The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle Path by Kalupahana David J.
The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle Path
David J. Kalupahana
The relationship between the earliest form of Buddhism and the various 
traditions that developed later has been a perennial problem in the history 
of Buddhist thought. As is well known to students of Buddhist philosophy, 
the different schools of the Abhidharma or scholastic tradition, in spite 
of rather significant doctrinal variations among themselves, all claimed to 
preserve the Buddha-word in its pristine purity. The Mahayana schools, 
adopting philosophical standpoints very different from those of scholas­
ticism, upheld the view that theirs represent the true teachings of the 
Buddha. Many a modem scholar, after aligning himself with one or the 
other of these later philosophical developments, has endeavoured to draw 
a close relationship between the school he has accepted and early Bud­
dhism. In the present paper, I propose to show that early Buddhism, as 
embodied in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas, which are 
recognized by all the different schools as representing the earliest sources 
for the study of Buddhism, is radically different from all these schools, at 
least as far as their philosophical content is concerned.
Even though some of the later developed schools did not recognize all 
the discourses included in the Nikayas and the Agamas as being authori­
tative, fortunately there is at least one discourse that carried the stamp of 
authority so much so that all schools of Buddhism, both Hinayana and 
Mahayana, studied it with veneration and respect. This is acknowledged 
by even a prominent Mahayana philosopher like Candrakirti.1 Moreover, 
this discourse deals with the most fundamental doctrine in Buddhism and, 
therefore, any difference that can be noted with regard to the interpreta-
1 Midhyamikavrtti (Madhyamakokdrikas) (abbr. MKV)t ed. L. de la Vallie Poussin 
(SL Piters bourg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1903-13), p. 269: Idam ca sulrajjt 
sarvanikdyefu pa[hyalg.
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tion of the ideas embodied here would indicate the difference subsisting 
between the early and later forms of Buddhism. The discourse is known as 
Kaccdyanagotta-sutta (NagAijuna calls it Kdtydyan&oandda-sutra) and is in­
cluded in the Samyutta-mkdya2 and the Tsa-a-han Ching The text
3 Sarpyutta-mkAya, ed. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, 1960), 2.16-17.
3 TaishB SkinshS Daizbkyi^ ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (Tokyo: Taisho Shuppan 
Company, 1924-34), 2.85c.
of this discourse, as found in the Pali Nikayas, is as follows:
While the Exalted One was at Savatthi the venerable Kaccayana 
of that clan came to visit him, and saluting him sat down at one 
side. So seated he asked the Exalted One, saying: “Lord, we hear 
the phrase ‘right view, right view? Now how far is there a right 
view?”
“This world, Kaccayana, usually bases [its view] on two 
things: on existence (atthila) and on nonexistence (n'althiid). Now 
he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it 
really is, does not hold with the nonexistence of the world. But 
he, who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as 
it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world.”
“The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by ap­
proach, attachment, and inclination. And the man who does not 
go after that approach and attachment, determination of mind, 
inclination and disposition, does not cling to or take up the stand, 
[does not think]: ‘This is my soul!’—who thinks: ‘That which 
arises is just suffering, that which passes away is suffering,’—this 
man is not in doubt, is not perplexed. Knowledge herein is his, 
not merely other-dependent. Thus far, Kaccayana, he has ‘right 
view.* ’*
“ ‘Everything exists’ (sabbam atthi): this is one extreme. ‘Every­
thing does not exist* (sabbam n'atthi): this is the other extreme. Not 
approaching either extreme the Tathagata teaches you a doctrine 
by the middle [way]: Conditioned by ignorance dispositions come 
to pass; conditioned by dispositions is consciousness; conditioned 
by consciousness is the psychophysical personality; conditioned 
by the psychophysical personality are the six senses; conditioned *3
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by the six senses is contact; conditioned by contact is feeling; 
conditioned by feeling is craving; conditioned by craving is 
grasping; conditioned by grasping is becoming; conditioned by 
becoming is birth; conditioned by birth is decay-and-death, grief, 
suffering . . . even such is the uprising of this entire mass of suf­
fering. But from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance 
(arises) ceasing of dispositions, and thus comes ceasing of this 
entire mass of suffering.”
This discourse refers to two philosophical theories, existence or Being 
(atlhita, Sk. astita, Ch. yu <) and nonexistence or non-Being (n’atthitd, Sk. 
nfatita, Ch. wu yu There is no difficulty in identifying these two
theories.4 The former is the traditional Upani$adic doctrine according to 
which everything in this world is filled with (pHr^a) a reality which is 
the ultimate ground of existence (astitoa). It is the permanent, eternal, 
and substantial “self,” variously known as Atman or Brahman. Hence 
the Buddha’s criticism that this theory of “existence” leads to the belief 
in permanence (sassata, Sk. Safoat, Ch. ch'ang chu #•£). The other is the 
doctrine of the Materialists who, in spite of their doctrine of natural 
determinism (svabhava-vada), were considered to be annihilationists 
(ucchedavadin) because they denied causality of moral behavior, etc. More­
over, the Materialists also denied the existence of a reality of the sort the 
Upanijadic thinkers acknowledge, and hence were popularly known as 
“nihilists” (n'atthika-vddd). The Buddha, too, while refraining from 
criticizing their conception of natural determinism,5 rejected their theory 
as being nihilistic primarily because of their denial of free-will and moral 
responsibility. Buddha’s reasons for rejecting both these theories seem to 
be extremely significant.
4 See my Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: University Press of 
Hawaii, 1975), pp. 5-53.
3 See my explanation of this problem in Causality, p. 41.
The two extremes of existence and nonexistence—namely, the percep­
tions of ceasing (nirodha) and arising (uppada), respectively—were rejected 
because they were contrary to the perceptions of one who understands 
things as they are. Arising and ceasing, no doubt, are empirical facts and, 
therefore, the argument for the rejection of the two extremes is empirical. 
Not only did the Buddha resort to empirical arguments for the rejection 
of the two metaphysical extremes, but also he replaced them with an 3
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empiricist view. Thus, the “middle path” (majjkimd palipada, Sk. madhyama 
pratipat, Ch. chung too ^31) between the two extremes of existence and 
nonexistence is presented as causation or “dependent arising” 
(paticcasamuppada) which explains the pattern according to which things in 
the world arise and pass away. The conception of “dependence” (pratityd) 
enabled the Buddha to avoid the two metaphysical assumptions regarding 
causation, namely, (a) the potential existence of the effect in the cause, 
hence the substantial connection between them or (b) the potential non­
existence of the effect and hence the absence of any connection between 
the cause and the effect.
There cannot be any controversy regarding the message of the discourse. 
It is a straightforward and unequivocal statement of an empriricist theory 
of causation which steers clear of two metaphysical ideas of substantial 
permanence on the one hand, and nihilistic impermanence on the other. 
The “theory of dependence,” in such a context, explains the causal rela­
tionship among impermanent factors of existence.
This was the “middle path” the Buddha claimed he discovered under 
the Bodhi-tree. It was this philosophical middle position that was the basis 
of the ethical path of “moderation” between the two extremes of self­
mortification and self-indulgence that constitute the subject of his first 
discourse—the DhammacakkapaoalUma-sutta^ In the early discourses, this 
middle path was never explained as something indefinable (artirvacaniya) 
or as indescribable {aoacya) in any way. The only remark made is that it 
is “beyond the sphere of logic” (atakkavacara, Sk. atarkavacara\ but for very 
specific reasons. It was a doctrine “deep, difficult to perceive, difficult to 
comprehend, but tranquil, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible 
to the learned,” yet a “matter not easily understood by those delighting in 
attachment, those rejoicing in attachment.”6 7 The argument seems to be 
that if a person is excessively attached to a certain theory, no amount of 
logic or dialectic could convince him of the truth of any other theory. 
Hence, to those recluses and brahmans deeply immersed in metaphysical 
views (ditthi, Sk. drfti, Ch. chien ^), “dependent arising” or causal hap­
pening (paticcasamuppada) was a difficult doctrine to accept. So much for 
the “middle path” in early Buddhism.
6 Samyutta-nikfya 5.420.
7 Majjhima-nikdya, cd. V. Treckner (London: Pali Text Society, 1948), 1.167; TauAtf 
1.7770778a.
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The scholastic traditions which developed theories of moments (kjaita) 
and atoms (paramdtju) were faced with the rather difficult taks of explaining 
causal continuity.8 One of the ways in which the scholiasts tried to resolve 
the problem of the continuity of the discrete momentary phenomena 
{dharma) was by accepting the dualistic theory of substance {svabhdva) 
and qualities (lak^aija). They upheld that the qualities were in a state of 
flux, changing every moment, while the substance remained unchanged 
throughout the three periods of time—past, present, and future. This 
came to be known as the theory of “everything exists’* {saroam asti) which 
was upheld by the Sarv^stivadins. It may be noted that this very same 
theory constituted one of the extremes referred to and criticized by the 
Buddha in the Kaudyanagotta-sutta. The Sautrantikas certainly spared no 
pains in refuting this doctrine of substance (yvabhdva) which they equated 
with the idea of “soul** or “self” (atman).9 10
8 See Causality, pp. 67-B8.
9 SphufArthdbhidharmakoiavydkhyS (abbr. Sakv) of Yatomitra, ed. U. Wogihara (Tokyo: 
Publication Association of Abhidharmakoiapydkhyd, 1(932-36), p. 362: svabhAvala ity dtmalah.
10 Abhidharmadipa with Vibhdfdprabhdvjtli, ed. P. S. Jaini (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Re­
search Institute, 1959)} p. 270.
How did the SarvAstivadins counter this criticism? Naturally, by 
reinterpreting the implications of the Kaecdyanagotta-sutta. In the 
Vibhdjdprabhdortti> a commentary on the Abhidharmadipa that was written 
in order to explicate the genuine Sarvastivada point of view in opposition 
to the ideas expressed in the Abhidharmakofa with its Sautrantika leanings, 
we find this reevaluation of the Kaccdyanagotta-sutta™ Here the author 
points out that in the discourses the Buddha taught a “middle path” 
according to which (i) all component things (samskdrdb) are empty 
{iunyab) of falsely conceived notions such as “person” {puru$a) or “recepta­
cle consciousness” {dlaya-vijnana) and other such imaginations, and (2) 
all component things are not empty or nonempty (aSunydh) of specific 
and general characteristics {svasdmanyalak^aija). This implies that the re­
cognition of a reality such as “person” (punqa) posited by the Sankhya 
school or by the “personalists” {pudgala-vddin) of the Buddhist tradition or 
“receptacle consciousness” (alaya-vijhdna) of the Yogacarins would con­
tribute to a theory of permanent existence {astitva) and a denial of specific 
and general characteristics {svasamdnyalakjana') of dharmas, as admitted by 
the Sarv^stivadins, would lead to nihilistic nonexistence {ndstitva).
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Specific characteristic (svalak$ana) of a dharma is identified with “sub­
stance” (dravya, svabhava) which was looked upon by the Sarvastivadins as 
“ultimate reality” (param artha sat).11 When the Madhyamikas rejected 
“substance” (svabhava) as an “ultimate reality,” they were certainly reject­
ing the Sarv^stivida conception of dharma.12 It is therefore easy to see 
that in the eyes of the Sarvastivadins the doctrine of “emptiness’ (ftinyata) 
of the Madhyamikas was none other than a theory of nonexistence or 
nihilism (nastitva). Thus, for the Sarvastivadins, the two extremes men­
tioned in the Kaccqyanagotta-sutta are the Yog^cara theory of “receptacle 
consciousness” (dlaya-vijfidna) and the Madhyamika conception of “emp­
tiness” (tunyata).
11 Abhidharmakolabhd$ya, cd. P. Pradhan (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 
1967), p. 341: Kayaiji svasdmdnyalakfOQdbhydm parikfaU, vcdancm cittarfi dharmas ca. Svabhava 
cvaifdrji svalakfanarjx. Sarndnyalak/anaiji tu anityatd saipskrtdndfji duhkhata sdsravdnam sunyatd 
'ndtmatt sarvadharmdndip. Sakv, p. 524: paramdrthasat svalakfa&na sat ity arthah. Also, ibid., 
draryatah svalak/anatah sad dravya sad iti. Sec ibid., p. 529, svabhdva evaifdrji svalakfa^am-
12 See MKV, pp. 260-261, where the heat of fire (agrur au/nya/ji) is described as “sub­
stance” (svabhdva) as well as “specific characteristic” (svalakfava).
13 In fact, the SarvSstividins claimed themselves to be “substantialists” (sad-vddi); 
see Vibhdftyrabh&VYtti, p. 258.
14 See Causality, pp. 148-152.
Although the Sarvastivadins made a determined attempt to distinguish 
their doctrines from those of the Sankhya, Yog&cara, and Madhyamika, 
yet the recognition of an enduring substance (svabhava, dravya, svalakfaija) 
as the ultimate reality of things (dharma) as opposed to their phenomenal 
characteristics (lak^a^a or samanyalakfa^a) placed them on the side of the 
“substantialists” (sad-vadi).i3 For this reason, their doctrine of causation 
through substance (svabhava) was not at all different from the identity 
theory of causation (satkaiyavada) of Sankhya.14 True, the Sarvastivadins 
recognized the theory of causation with twelve factors, as is done in the 
Kaccayanagotta-sutta, but their theory is so closely associated with the con­
ception of substance that it is no longer the empirical doctrine of causation 
in early Buddhism but a metaphysical view of the extreme form.
In contrast, the Sautrantikas, while upholding a theory of moments 
(kfaya), vehemently denied the existence of any substance or substratum 
(svabhava or dravya). The Sautrantikas, who refused to recognize two sepa­
rate moments, static (sthiti) and decay (jara), but considered them to be 
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one characteristic (ekam eva lakfaqam)** certainly would not accept the 
concept of “specific characteristic” (sualak$and) which was identified with 
the permanent and eternal substance (svabhava, dravya). But as empiricists 
who recognized the nonconccptual grasp of the external objects at the 
first moment of perception (pratyakja), they upheld, or, at least, spoke of 
“specific characteristics” (svalakfaija)1 6 without identifying it with sub­
stance (svabhdva). (This confirms our view, stated earlier, that for 
the Sarv^stivadins, the nihilists—nastika—were represented by the 
Madhyamikas, and not the Sautrantikas).
1S Abhidharmakosabhafya, p. 76, attributes this view to some “other” (anyd) [school], 
but Yaiomitra identifies the school as the Sautrantika; see Sako, p. 139, any* punar ahur 
iti Sautrtbi[t]ikdh.
10 See T. I. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic n (New York: Dover, 1962), p. 312.
17 Safar, p. 11.
18 Sikfdsamuceaya, ed. C. Bendall (St Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 
1897-1902), p. 248: iti hy abhutva bhavati bhOioa prativigacchati svabhSvarahitaivdt\ see also 
Causality, pp. 151-154.
The Sautrantika denial of substance (svabhava) should have made them 
the faithful representatives of early Buddhism—hence their claim to be 
the upholders of the tradition of the discourses (sutrapramaijikd)*1 They 
were, no doubt, non-substantialists. But, unfortunately, their theory of 
non-substantiality (anatmavada, nifysvabhavavadd) was presented in the back­
ground of a metaphysical theory of moments and hence they were unable 
to account for causality (pratityasamutpada). This theory of discrete momen­
tary phenomena compelled them to accept a causal principle which 
involved metaphysical assumptions. They maintained that a nonexistent 
phenomenon arises during one moment and passes away into nonexistence 
during the next, without enduring even for one moment, because it has 
no substantial existence.18 This view shared all the salient features of the 
nonidentity theory of causation {asatkdryavdda} of the Vai$e$ika school. 
Not only did the theory fail to account for the momentary arising of the 
effect, but also it implied the complete annihilation (yindfa) of the effect 
immediately after its arising. Thus, while the SarvSstivada attempt to 
explain causation in the background of a theory of moments led them to 
a substantialist position, the Sautrantika doctrine of nonsubstantiality 
(anatma, nifysvabhava) placed them in the position of annihilationists 
(ucchedavddi}.
It is now possible to examine the “middle path” as enunciated in the 
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Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The doctrines of the two Abhidharma 
schools, Sarvclstivada and Sautrantika, undoubtedly served as the imme­
diate philosophical background of Madhyamika thought. Although these 
two schools with their theories of causation provided the setting necessary 
for the Madhyamika dialectic, Madhyamika philosophy should not be 
considered a mere reaction to these two schools. On the contrary, this 
school at least in its undeveloped form, had independent existence before 
Nagiijuna organized it into a coherent system. This undeveloped stage 
is represented by the Prajnaparamita literature, and especially by the 
Vajracchedika-prajHaparantitd.
Here we need to digress a little from the discussion of the middle path. 
The concept of Buddha is the most important topic of discussion in the 
Prajfiap£ramita literature. Buddha Gotama was a historical person. The 
discourses of the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas afford us ample 
evidence of that.19 He influenced the life and thought of the people of 
India during his time to such an extent that superhuman qualities came 
to be attributed to him, not only after his death but even while he was 
alive. These qualities—intellectual, moral, and even physical—soon raised 
him to the position of a divine being {deva) in the eyes of his followers. 
The result was that the followers themselves became puzzled as to the 
real nature of the Buddha’s personality. When the question regarding the 
Buddha’s personality was raised, the Buddha himself answered that he 
was neither a man (manussa), nor a water spirit (gandhabba), nor a powerful 
demoniac spirit (yakkha), nor even a god (deva) or a Brahma, but that he 
was only a Buddha.20 Similar questions were being raised even two cen­
turies after his death, during the reign of Aioka, the Maurya, in the third 
century bc,21 thus, it became one of the most important and relevant 
topics of discussion in the history of Buddhist thought.
19 See article on “Buddha,” in Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Vol. 3.
20 Xri^uttara-nijUya, ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy (London: Pali Text Society, 1955), 
2.3B-39; Taishi 2.a8a-b.
21 Kathttoatthu, ed. A C. Taylor (London: Pali Text Society, 1894-1897), 18.1-4.
The passing away of the Buddha created a big vacuum in the lives of 
his followers and admirers. The Mahdparinibbanasuttanta which relates the 
incidents in the last days of the Buddha’s life seems to indicate this. To 
perpetuate the memory of the Buddha, the Buddha himself recommended 
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to his followers four places of pilgrimage.22 The desire of the faithful fol­
lowers to have the Buddha as an object of worship contributed to the 
development of the conception of an eternal spiritual body (dharmakaya) 
of the Buddha.
22 Digha-rtikdya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (London: Pali Text 
Society, 1903), 2.140.
23 Sec my Buddhist Philosophy* A Historical Analysis (Honolulu: University Press of 
Hawaii, 1975), chapter 7; also Causality, pp. 178-180.
24 Saddharmapuru}arika-sutra, ed. U. Wogihara and C. Tsuchida (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyu- 
kai, 1934-1936), p. 271.
25 Ibid., p. 272.
26 Vajracchedika PrajOdparamitd, ed. and tr. E. Conze, Serie Orientals Roma san (Rome: 
Isdtuto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957), p. 56.
In the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas, the question whether the 
Buddha exists after death was regarded as a metaphysical question and was 
left unanswered. It was left unanswered not because, as some Buddhist 
scholars seem to think, the Buddha continued after death in a transcenden­
tal form, hence indefinable and indescribable, but because there was no 
way of knowing (na pamayam atthi) on the basis of personal experience 
whether he continues or not.23 24But in the Mahayana tradition, especially 
as embodied in texts like AfoAJc’ojrw, Lalitavistara, and Saddharmapuijdarika- 
siltra, Buddha came to be looked upon as one who remained forever (sadd 
sthita)** and his parinirvaya came to be considered a mere illusion.25 The 
Buddha became a supramundane and immortal person. His body 
(rupakaya) could not represent his real nature. Therefore, the Vajracchedika 
maintains: “The Tathagata is not to be recognized by means of the marks 
on his body.*’26 The real body of the Buddha is the spiritual body 
[dharmakaya). The Buddha’s real body is not only spiritual but cosmic as 
well. While the spiritual body is identified with all the constituents of the 
universe (sarva-dharmd), it is also considered to be the same as ultimate 
reality (tathata). Running through the entire PrajhiparamitS literature is 
the conflict between the nondual (advaya) absolute reality, the dharmakaya, 
and the pluralistic phenomenality. To resolve this conflict we find the 
Vajracchedika adopting the all important standpoint that ultimate reality 
is beyond description.
This digression from the discussion of the middle path is necessary to 
understand the Madhyamika position. The Madhyamikas, as their name 
implies, claim to follow the middle path. But the first Mahayana text 
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which refers to the middle path and which is often quoted by the 
Madhyamikas themselves is the Kdlyapaparivarta of the Ratnakuta-sutra. It 
is a formative text of the Mahayana school that came to be looked upon 
with great respect by most Mahayana teachers and represents, according 
to our understanding, a statement of the transition from early Buddhism 
to Madhyamika. Here we come across what appears to be two versions of 
the Kaccayanagotta-sutta, but with a different interlocutor—KaSyapa. One 
of these versions is more faithful to the original Kaccdyanagolta-sutta. It 
reads:
“[Everything] exists,” Kaiyapa, is one extreme. “[Everything] 
does not exist,” KaSyapa, is the second extreme. In between these 
two extremes, KaSyapa, is the middle path, because it is the 
correct perception of things.27
27 Kdiyafiaparivarta of the Ratnakufa-sHtra, ed. A. Stafcl-Holstcin (Shanghai: Commercial 
Press, 1926), p. 90.
22 Ibid, p. 87.
The middle path is further defined in terms of the twelvefold chain of 
causation in its progressive and regressive orders. By preserving this 
version, the Kdtyapapanvarta, though an extremely important Mahayana 
text, seems to vouch for the authenticity of the Kaccayanagotta-sutta as 
found in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas. Here, as in the 
NikSya and Aga ma statement, the two metaphysical theories are re­
jected and a middle position embodying a causal description of the 
phenomenal world is presented.
The second version found in the Kdfyapaparioarta, though dealing with a 
middle path between two extremes, is very different from the above. This 
statement reads:
“Self” (atma), Kafyapa, is one extreme. “No-self” (nairatmyd) is 
the second extreme. In between these two extremes is the middle 
position that is formless, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal, 
signless, and nonconceptual. This, KaSyapa, is called the middle 
path, the correct perception of things?8
Although the two extremes, “self” and “no-self” may relate to the two 
extremes, existence and nonexistence mentioned in the Kaccdyanagotta- 
sutta, yet the statement as such is conspicuous by its absence in the Nikayas *22
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and the Aga mas. There is no doubt that this second version is an innova­
tion attempting to explain the development of the doctrine. While the 
Hindu schools as well as Sarvistivada accepted a theory of “self” (alma) 
or something bordering on a theory of “self,” the Sautrantika school of 
Buddhism adamantly held on to a theory of “no-self” (nairdimya or 
mfcsvabJufoa). Naturally, the Mahayana doctrine of ultimate reality, equated 
in the early MahSySna with the Buddha’s spiritual body, had to represent 
the “middle” position. But this middle position is not phenomenal. It is 
transcendental; hence the use of the negative characteristics to describe it.
In the MulamadJiyamakakankd, NagAijuna refers to the Kdtydyanaoaoada- 
sUtra (i.e., Kacc&yanagotta-sutta) and maintains that in this context the 
Buddha rejected the two extremes of existence (asti) and nonexistence 
(ndsti).29 A faithful disciple like Candrakirti was, therefore, compelled to 
look at this Katyayandvavada-sHtra. After observing that this discourse is 
studied in all the schools of Buddhism, he quotes a section of the 
Kaccayanagotta-sutta in some original version (not in the Kdtyapapaiivarta 
version mentioned above).30 But when he had to comment on the middle 
path he ignores all the versions which refer to the twelvefold formula of 
causation and switches on to the second version from the Katyapaparivarta 
that has very little in common with the Kaccdyanagotta-sutta and which 
describes the middle path in negative terms.31
29 Midafnadkfamakakirikd
30 MKV, pp. 269-270.
31 Ibid., p. 270.
The Kdtyapaparwarta, therefore, is an invaluable text that explains one 
of the most controversial subjects in the history of Buddhist thought, 
namely, the transition from early Buddhism to Mahayana. While preserv­
ing a statement of an empirical theory of causation presented in the 
background of two metaphysical ideas, it also puts forward a conception 
of a linguistically transcendent middle path, thereby relating itself to the 
Prajfiaparamita doctrine of the indefinable and indescribable ultimate 
reality.
Let us examine this “transcendentalism” in more detail. Transcenden­
talism, as pointed out earlier, developed gradually in the Mahayana 
tradition in connection with the conception of Buddha and reached its 
culmination in the Prajfiaparamita literature. On the other hand, the 
Abhidharma scholiasts, engrossed with the doctrines of moments and 
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atoms, presented metaphysical theories of causation in their attempt to 
explain the phenomenal world. Both these trends convinced NigAijuna 
of the futility of depending on linguistic conventions (samorti) as a means 
of explaining reality (paramdrtha), except as a means to an end.
The Mulamadhyamakakdrika represents one determined attempt to deny 
the reality of arising (utpada) and ceasing (m'rodta). This seems to have 
been necessary if one were to hold on to the Mahayana conception of 
dharmakdya as the eternal and permanent reality, also known as tathatd, 
paramartha sat, etc. Fortunately for Nag&rjuna, the Sarvastivadins and the 
Sautrantikas had created a “conflict in reason” by explaining causality 
in such a metaphysical way that he either had to accept arising (utpada) 
of things on the basis of an underlying substance or substratum (svabhdva) 
(i.e., the satkaiyavada of the Sarvastivadins) or was compelled to deny a 
substance and therefore arising too (i.e., the logical conclusion of the 
Sautrantika asatkdryaoada}. The theory of moments did not permit 
Nag&rjuna to accept arising and passing away without positing a sub­
stance.
Not only was he unable to explain arising and passing away, he was 
not in a position even to accept relativity as embodied in the statement: 
“When this exists, that exists” (asmin sattdam bhavati)22 This means causa­
tion of any sort could not be explained without falling into one of the two 
extremes, existence and nonexistence. It is this selfsame idea that 
Candrakirti was attempting to substantiate by repeatedly quoting a 
quatrain from what was known to him as Anaoataptahraddpasamkramaiyi- 
sutra:
Whatever is bom of causes is unborn for it has no arising through 
substance. That which is dependent on causes is empty. He who 
understands emptiness is diligent.32 3 34
32 MfLlamadhyamakakSrikS 1.10.
33 MKV, pp. 239, 500, 504: yah praiyayair jiyati sa hy ajStofno tasya. utpddu svabhauato'sti] 
yah pralyay&dhiiui sa siinya uh to jy ah iunyalarji jdnaii so 'pramaitafy.
34 MKV3 pp. 516-517.
This is supplemented by two quotations, (a) from the MajnuSripariprcchd 
and (b) from Aiyadhydyitamu^ti-sUtra. These quotations are found at the end 
of his commentary to the very important chapter of the Karika on the 
“Examination of the Noble Truths” (Aryasatyaparikjd)2* Both quotations 
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explain the manner in which one should try to comprehend the Four 
Noble Truths. The latter maintains:
By him, ManjuSri, who has seen all dharmas as unborn, unsatis­
factoriness is understood. For him who has seen all dharmas as 
unproduced, arising is eliminated. By him who has seen all 
dharmas as completely extinguished, nirvana is realized. By him 
who has seen all dharmas as absolutely empty, the path has been 
cultivated.
This is the very opposite of the argument in the early discourses where 
things were considered to be unsatisfactory primarily because they are 
impermanent (anicca), which is a synonym for arising and passing away 
(uppadavaya)** As the eight negations indicate, not only arising (utpada) 
and ceasing (mWta), but also permanence (iafvata) and annihilation 
(ucctuda), identity (Mrtha) and difference (nanartha), coming (dgama) 
and going (nirgama) are concepts not applicable to reality.35 6 37Thus not 
only the metaphysical concepts like permanence and annihilation, but 
even non metaphysical concepts like arising and ceasing cannot be applied 
to reality. The Prajnaparamita doctrine of the indescribability of ultimate 
reality finds perfect philosophical justification here. The nature and 
function of language appear in a different light. Conventional terms 
(sammuti), which in early Buddhism were symbols agreed upon by popular 
consent to denote the various experiences or combinations of experiences, 
are now looked upon as deceptive veils (varaija) concealing in every way 
(samantdd) the true nature of things: hence sanwrti*1 Even the dichotomy 
between knowledge and the object of knowledge (jndnajfaya) (not subject 
and object) is valid only at this level. Ultimate reality is free from such 
dichotomy.38 39This ultimate reality ^paramdrlha) is independent, peaceful, 
nonconceptual, and is to be experienced (vedya—not “known,” jneya) for 
or within oneself (pratyatma) by the wise one. It cannot be indicated [as 
this or that] nor can it be known (na jndyate)
35 Saipyulta 1.191, 3.146; TcdihS 2.153c.
36 MKV, p. 3.
37 Ibid., p. 492.
38 Ibid., p. 493; see also p. 135.
39 Ibid.
Thus, the Madhyamikas deny the ability to know ultimate reality as an 
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objective phenomenon. The dichotomy between knowledge and the known 
is emphatically denied. But the possibility realizing the nature of ultimate 
reality within oneself is recognized. This seems also the conclusion of the 
very important chapter on the “Examination of Elements” (Dhatuparikfa) 
of the Mulamadhyamakakdrikd which emphasizes the pacification of the 
object (dra$tavya-upafama)f0 rather than the pacification of views (dffti- 
upasama)' implying thereby that the latter could not be achieved without 
achieving the former. This also explains the basic difference between early 
Buddhism and Madhyamika thought as far as another of the important 
concepts is concerned, namely, the concept of prapafica.
The term papafica in early Buddhism is understood as “obsession.” 
Hence, papancopasama as a definition of nibbana implies pacification of all 
obsessions. A person who has eliminated these obsessions can continue 
not only to know things in the external world as they are (yathdbhuta) 
but also to use the linguistic conventions (sammuti) without overstepping 
their limits, i.e., without using them to designate things not given in ex­
perience. For example, he will be able to use the term “self” (a/to, Sk. 
atman) as a reflexive pronoun without implying by this the existence of a 
transempirical entity, permanent and eternal. This is because he has 
eliminated the root of all obsessions, namely, craving (taijha). Hence 
papancavdpasama becomes a synonym for dilthi-vtipasama, “pacification of 
all views,” where ditthi refers to the manner of seeing. For this purpose it 
is not necessary to attain dra^tavyopaiama or pacification of the object, i.e., 
the complete elimination of the object from one’s understanding. But in 
the Madhyamika system, since there is a recognition of an ultimate reality 
(paramartha) which is nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) as opposed to the con­
ventional (xoiTwrti), prapanca comes to mean conceptual proliferation. For 
this reason, the Madhyamikas will not be able to entertain the very idea 
of “object,” hence draftavyopaiama. It is extremely significant to note that 
this pacification of the object is presented by Nagarjuna as a middle posi­
tion between the two extremes of existence (orfitaz) and nonexistence 
(ndstitva). How far this position is related to the YogScara standpoint that 
the object (alambana) is not real seems to be an interesting question.
In the light of what has been stated above, I propose to analyse the 
meaning and significance of the MfUamadhyamakakarikd statement of the 
middle path. It runs thus:
40 MiUamadlyamakakSrikd 5.7.
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Whatever dependent arising is, that we call emptiness. That (i.e., 
emptiness) is a dependent concept and that itself is the middle 
path.
Yafy pratUyasamutpddalj. Idnyatdm tam pracakfmahe. Sa prajnaptxr 
updddya pralipal saiva madhyamd*1
Candrakirti’s assistance in unravelling the rather abstruse meaning of 
this quatrain is extremely valuable. We have already referred to the 
M^dhyamika argument that whatever is caused or is dependently arisen 
is really uncaused or unborn because it does not arise as a result of 
“substance” (svabhduendnutpatti}. Causation cannot be explained without 
admitting a substance. But a substance does not exist in reality. Therefore, 
causation or dependent arising is empty. But what about this emptiness 
(fUnyatd) itself? Is emptiness (ffinyata) an empty and misleading concept 
(jopgrti), like “substance” (.rooMimi)? This is the last thing the 
Madhyamikas would want to admit. In fact, a major portion of the 
chapter on the “Examination of the Noble Truths” (Aryasalyaparikja) is 
devoted to a refutation of the view that “emptiness” (Sunyatd) is “nothing­
ness” or “nihilism” {ndstitvd}. Thus, the Madhyamikas are forced to accept 
at least one concept that is “dependent” or “denotative” {updddya 
prajnapti'), and that is tunyaid. Sunyatd is not a mere empty concept {samcrti) 
but the ultimate truth {paramartha salya), and therefore, the use of the term 
updddya prajnapti instead of samvrti to refer to it (although of course, the 
terms sammuti, in its original meaning, and pannatti were used synonymously 
in early Buddhism). It is identical with tathata, dharmakdya, Buddha, and 
even pratityasamutpdda (in spite of the earlier criticism), all of which were 
transcendental and hence described in negative characteristics only. It is 
also what has to be experienced or felt {ycdya) for oneself (pratydtman) 
with the attainment of perfect enlightenment {samyaksambodhi).
Does this mean that “emptiness” (filnyatd) is substantial? The 
Madhyamika reply will certainly be in the negative. Emptiness is not 
substantial in the same way as substance is substantial. Similarly, emp­
tiness is not empty in the same way as substance is empty. Emptiness is 
empty of conceptual proliferation {prapancafunya') and, therefore, non- 
conceptual (mrvikalpa). This is the significance of another oft-quoted 
statement defining ultimate reality:
A1 Ibid., 24.18.
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Independent, peaceful, conceptually nonproliferated, noncon- 
ceptual, nondiversified—this is the characteristic of reality 
(taitva).
AparapTatyayaqi fdntarn prapafcair aprapancitarji nirvikalpaip 
andn&rtham etat tattvasya lakjaiyam*2
Now we are in a position to analyse the nature of the middle path 
(madhyama pratipat) referred to in the quatrain quoted earlier. Of the two 
extremes, there seems to be no difficulty in identifying the first, i.e., 
existence (astitoa). For Nag&ijuna and for all the Madhyamikas, “exis­
tence” meant the existence of a substantial entity (an alma or svabhdva) in 
phenomena (dharma}. “Nonexistence” (ndstitva), therefore, would mean the 
absence of any such substantial entity, in other words, absolute nonexis­
tence or nihilism. The middle path that steers clear of these two extremes is, 
therefore, the reality (tathatatparamarthasat} that transcends all linguistic ex­
pression (samorti). This explains the Madhyamika, or even the Mahayana, 
characterization of the middle path with negative epithets such as form­
less, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal, signless, nonconceptual. This is 
not at all different from the philosophy of the Prajnaparamita which em­
phasizes the linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality (paradmrthasatya).
T. R. V. Murti is credited with having written the most authoritative 
account of Madhyamika philosophy. His interpretation, therefore, has in 
some way or other influenced the understanding of the doctrines of this 
school. Unfortunately, in spite of the excellent analysis of Madhyamika 
ideas by Murti, one mistaken interpretation on his part has prevailed in 
the Western understanding of Madhyamika philosophy. The mistaken 
interpretation is of the following quatrain:
Existence and nonexistence are two extremes; 
Purity and impurity—these too are extremes; 
Therefore, having given up the two extremes, 
The wise one takes no position in the middle.
Astiti n astiti ubhe ’pi anta 
faddhi afaddhfti inu ’pi anta 
tasmad ubhe anta vivarjayitvd 
madhye ’pi sthdnam na karoti pandita^**
Ibid., 18.9; see also MKVt pp. 491, 493. 
*’ Afxr, pp. 135,270.
45
KALUPAHANA
The conclusion which Murti arrives at on the basis of this statement is 
expressed in the following quotation: “It may be thought that in avoiding 
the two extremes, the Madhyamika takes a middle position between the 
two. No; he does not hold any middle position. Or, the middle position is 
no position.”44 This analysis seems to be the basis of the very popular 
view: “Madhyamika position is no position.”
44 The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 129.
45 Ibid.; see note 4.
Unfortunately, Murti’s seems to be a rather strange conclusion. To say 
that one should give up two extremes and also the middle position is not 
tantamount to saying there is no middle position. If it does, it certainly 
seems to be a confusion (yiparydsa} not only of linguistic usage but also of 
logic. It is one thing to say that one should not grasp on to a middle 
position; yet another to say that there is no middle position. In fact, 
strange as it may seem, Murti himself then goes on to say, on the basis of 
the passages from the Kafyapaparivarta and the Mddhyamikavrtti quoted 
earlier, that the middle position is transcendental in that it is beyond concept 
and speech.45 This interpretation of Madhyamika philosophy by Murti 
has caught the fascination of many a Western scholar who got involved 
in the study of the Chinese Buddhist tradition, especially Ch’an or its 
Japanese counterpart, Zen. Ch’an is generally understood as denying any 
form of transcendentalism even though it seems to contribute to a theory 
of linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality. The influence of 
Madhyamika thought on the development of Ch’an goes uncontroverted. 
Therefore, Murti’s interpretation of Madhyamika philosophy as a doctrine 
of “no position” has received wide acceptance, especially because it 
harmonizes with the current interpretation of Ch’an.
In addition to the above unwarranted analysis of the Madhyamika 
statement, the interpretation of Madhyamika philosophy as one of “no 
position” seems to stem from the undue emphasis on, or, more specifically, 
the wrong understanding of the purpose of, the reductio ad absurdum 
(prasarigika) method adopted by NagHijuna. It is true that in the refutation 
of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence NagArjuna utilized the 
reductio ad absurdum method of not accepting any one of the views, but 
merely using one to refute the other. His use of this method was confined 
to a refutation of the phenomenal reality only. But he does not appear to 
have used it in order to reject the two truths, phenomenal or conventional 
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{sarpurti) and ultimate {paramdrtha), though these in some way may be 
taken to constitute two extremes like “purity” and “impurity” referred 
to in the above quatrain quoted from Candrakirti. On the contrary, he 
emphatically asserted the existence of ultimate reality or truth {paramartha 
sat) though he held it to be beyond conceptual thinking. Everything else, 
existent or nonexistent, falls under the category of conventional {samvrti).
In conclusion, it may be said that the last major school of Indian 
Buddhism—Yogacar a as represented in the Madhyantavibhdga {Examina­
tion of the Middle Path and the Extremes) of Maitreya—openly admitted the 
existence {sat) of the middle position between the two extremes of existence 
{sat) and nonexistence {asat).4e> Existence, for them, was of “constructive 
ideation” {abhutaparikalpa, i.e., ideation with regard to nonexistent 
phenomena). Nonexistence was of substance (dravya as svabhdva). In be­
tween these two extremes, says Vasubandhu in his Madhydntambhdga- 
bh&fya, is existence {sattva) of emptiness {iunyatd), which is the middle path 
between absolute emptiness {ekdntena fiinya) and absolute nonemptiness 
{ekantendfunya). This, according to Vasubandhu, is in conformity with the 
Prajnaparamita statements such as: “All is neither empty nor non­
empty.”46 7
46 MadtyAniavibhdga 1.2. Sec Madhy&nlavibhdgabhdfya, ed. G. M. Nagao (Tokyo: 
Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), p. 18: na iunyarjt ndpi cdsunyaqi tasmdl sarvaip vidhiyatt 
satvad asaiudt satodc ca madhyama pratifiac ca sa.
47 Madhydntatibhdgabhd&a, p. 18.
This analysis of the middle path creates another problem. If absolute 
emptiness is one extreme and absolute nonemptiness is another, what 
could be the middle position? The Madhyamikas maintained that the 
middle position is nonconceptual and therefore, indefinable and inde­
scribable. But for the Yogacarins, this is existence, i.e., transcendental 
existence {paramdrtha sat). If so, what remains is the phenomenal which 
the Madhyamikas had treated under the conventional {samvrti). For the 
Yogacarins, this is not a sensible position, for the phenomenal is not 
always identical with the conventional considered to be absolutely empty 
{idnya). On the one hand, there are conventions that are absolutely empty, 
hence abhutaparikalpa, i.e., mere conceptual construction. There are, on 
the other hand, conventions that embody phenomenal reality. This 
third level of truth or reality is substantial {dravyatafy sat), although it is 
not identical with the Sarvastivada “substance” {svabhdva). It is compara­
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ble to the Sautrantika conception of “specific characteristic” (svalaJqava) 
(discussed above).48 The recognition of this third level of truth or reality 
seems to have been prompted by the need to accomodate the phenomenal 
reality which the Madhyamikas denied when they considered all concepts 
(except those such as tUnyatd indicating the ultimate reality) to be empty 
and unreal. Hence the Madhyantauibhaga statement refers to the three 
degrees of truth—(i) sat or existence, i.e., ultimate reality (param artha 
sat), (2) asat or nonexistence, i.e., emptiness with regard to substance 
(svabhava) or self (atman), i.e., conceptual construction, and (3) sat or 
existence, i.e., existence of specific characteristics (svalakfanatab sat). 
These were the very same degrees of truth embodied in the more popular 
triad—(1) the ultimate (parinifparma), (2) the conceptual (parikalpita), 
and (3) the relative (paratantra), respectively. This middle position is rather 
unique in that it is not a middle position between two rejected extremes, 
but a third position.
48 Sakv, p. 524: Trividharn hi Yogdcfrandip sat, param&rtha saqwfti-sat drcaya-sac ca. 
Dravyalah svalakfajuitah sad dravya-sad iti. Note the nonuse of the term svabhdua to define 
dravya, although, defining the SarvAstivida conception, Yaiomitra (p. 529) said: 
svabhdoa sotdfirfi svalakftt^aiji (see note I i).
These different interpretations of the middle path in the later Buddhist 
schools would certainly enable the unprejudiced scholar to trace the 
manner in which the Buddhist doctrine underwent development through­
out the centuries since its first enunciation by Siddhartha Gautama at 
Buddhagaya.
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